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SJTREM has published an account by Sollid and collea-
gues of the pre-hospital medical response to the major
incidents, which occurred in Oslo and Utøya island on
July 22, 2011 [1]. Although very similar incidents have
occurred in Europe and elsewhere, this terrible day saw
the greatest loss of life recorded in this type of incident in
recent times. Internationally EMS providers looked on
with the certain knowledge that this type of incident is
sadly one that we all have to prepare for. It is unrelated to
national foreign policy, religious extremism or the exis-
tence of known terrorist activity. In short this type of inci-
dent is unpredictable and has the potential to happen in
any community at any time.
The aftermath of this type of incident is complex. Initi-
ally public and private grief dominates. There is then an
attempt to comprehend the motives and background to
apparently senseless acts that led to the tragic loss of inno-
cent lives. Usually there is intense scrutiny of the perpetra-
tor in an attempt to identify something in his or her
background which might have predicted the incident.
Inevitably the emergency response to the incidents is
examined sometimes objectively and sometimes less so.
The families of the victims and the public want to be reas-
sured that everything possible was done to prevent the
loss of life. Government legislation may result from inci-
dents - the Dunblane school killings in Scotland in 1996
which resulted in the death of fifteen small children and
their teacher led to rigorous controls on gun ownership in
the UK. Later the emergency services can be subject to
further scrutiny at inquests or public inquiries. These can
be months or years after the event (the inquests into the
London bombings in 2005 were only completed five years
later). The motivations behind requests for information
about the emergency response are varied. However,
placing objective information about the emergency service
response in the public domain is a responsible act. It
allows other EMS services nationally and internationally to
analyse and exercise their emergency responses to similar
incidents with credible background information. This may
allow improved emergency responses to future incidents
which may occur before the conclusions of lengthy public
or legal investigations. The authors of this paper are to be
commended for bringing objective information into the
medical literature in a timely manner after managing a dif-
ficult incident with great skill.
Although all major incidents are unique they all have
common elements. The incidents in July in Norway can
be usefully categorised to analyse the challenges faced
by the regional EMS system.
’Lone Wolf’ incidents
These incidents were difficult to predict. They are cate-
gorised by some authorities as ‘lone wolf’ incidents -
usually planned and executed by one individual and
unconnected to known organisations. They are often care-
fully planned. Other well documented ‘lone wolf type inci-
dents’ in the US include the Oklahoma bombing by
Timothy McVeigh in 1998 (168 deaths) [2] and the long
letter bomb campaign of Theodore Kaczynski. In Europe
the apparently racially motivated killings by John Ausonius
in Sweden and Franz Fuchs in Austria in the early 1990s,
two school shooting incidents in Finland in 2007 and
2008, and a series of nail bombs in London by David
Copeland in 1999 are all examples of this type of incident.
Although in retrospect, many of the perpetrators of these
incidents have exhibited dysfunctional behaviour, intelli-
gence on them or their intentions is rarely available since
they are not usually members of organisations.
Multiple incidents
Two incidents are described a few hours apart. Where
more than one major incident occurs simultaneously
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coordination and allocation of adequate resources is
always more difficult. There are numerous recent terror-
ist incidents that have involved multiple sites: the Istan-
bul bombings in 2003, the Madrid bombings in 2004 [3],
the London bombings in 2005 [4] and, most notably, the
Mumbai shootings in 2008 where ten incidents occurred
in one city. Despite this challenge the response times
described in this article are excellent. In Oslo the first
ambulance was on scene three minutes after the first
emergency call and a major incident was declared at
eight minutes. At twenty six minutes there were 41
ambulances on scene and at 90 minutes all immediate
needs had been met and the emergency resources were
effectively ready for redeployment. Examination of the
available literature reveals that most advanced EMS sys-
tems would struggle to achieve these timelines. At Utøya
island the challenges were more complex. In a more rural
location the first ambulance was on scene in nine min-
utes and a major incident declared at 21 minutes. Victims
could not be attended for more than an hour but the
complex scene was cleared of victims two hours after
first attendance. Despite the non-urban location of the
incident a considerable number of ambulances and air
ambulances with physicians were able to quickly attend
and evacuate the victims after access was achieved.
Scene safety
The problem of an armed perpetrator on scene preventing
access to victims is a relatively common problem in so
called ‘spree killing’ incidents. The perpetrators often com-
mit suicide but even when this happens confirmation of
scene safety often takes time. A comprehensive armed
police response is almost always more rapid in urban areas
since this is where most incidents occur. A slower
response in more rural locations is almost inevitable. In
2010 twelve people were killed by a gunman in Cumbria, a
rural county in the UK. The gunman was mobile and was
able to operate at multiple locations for more than two
hours before shooting himself. The scene at Utøya island
was additionally complicated by the presence of a powerful
weapon with long range and separation of the scene from
the mainland by water. In addition to rescuer access the
water made self evacuation from the scene difficult. The
previously described concept of ‘reverse triage’ [5] - where
the least injured patients present to medical rescuers
before the more seriously injured immobile patients is
described here. This appears to have been predicted and
managed well. Other scene hazards that are described
include bad weather and the presence of twelve helicopters
operating in the area.
Lessons learned
The authors describe a number of potential lessons that
emerged after early analysis of the incident. They
describe some failure of communication. It is unclear
whether this had any significant impact on patient out-
come. It is important to note that no well reported major
incident has ever been free of communication issues.
Providing good care without perfect communication
should be the aim of all EMS systems. This appears to
have happened in these incidents and may have been due
to the presence of senior physicians and paramedics at
the scene. Analysis of multiple scenes after the London
bombings suggested improved triage and low mortality
associated with physician-paramedic teams on scene [5].
This was the model used at these incidents and the mor-
tality after attendance by physician-paramedic teams is
reported as very low. The fact that sixty flight movements
were recorded during this incident does demonstrate the
importance of air ambulances at this type of incident. It
would be valuable to model the likely attendance times of
advanced medical teams and evacuation times of casual-
ties without the use of helicopters. The need to re-site
the casualty clearing station is a good learning point but
the initial site may well have appeared reasonable given
the information available at the time. Security after iden-
tification of the threat appears to have been excellent.
The authors suggest that a national triage guideline is
required. It is difficult to know how many high level
practitioners really rely on triage tools at major incidents
but having one recognised system would seem good
practice.
This paper provides a valuable insight into a complex
and unpredictable incident. Other EMS systems may well
benefit from the initial lessons learned. Similar incidents
on a smaller scale are reported regularly and have been
reportedly increasing in frequency [6]. This report also
highlights the need for an international template to iden-
tify the medical lessons learned from major incidents
which can be produced easily and quickly to propagate
widely to the international EMS community. The pre-hos-
pital response described in this article is impressive and it
is difficult to see how the mortality in these incidents
could have been improved. While the scale of this tragedy
is immense for Norway, many aspects of the response to it
will be viewed by international EMS systems as an exam-
ple of good practice in major incident management.
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